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and reuse, as described in Blanchard and Fabrycky
(2006). Industries and some agencies also adopt their
own acceptable way for developing systems, as
embodied in their respective standards such as MILSTD-499B, EINIS 632, IEEE 1220, EIA 632, 1SO/IEC
15288, and others. Nonetheless, systems development
starts with goals that need to be satisfied. Based on
these goals, necessary capabilities are identified.
Functionalities are then identified to support the
capabilities. Finally, sub-systems or components are
identified which will enable the performance of the
functionalities. This hierarchy can be represented as a
tree (Exhibit 1) which allows the traceability from the
sub-system level up to the goal level.

Abstract
The scope of this paper is the exploration of
fundamental issues in identifying risk scenarios during
systems development. Systems development refers to a
series of processes which span conceptualization,
designing the architecture, obtaining the elements, and
eventually integr_ating all these elements into the fully
developed final system. For truly sustainable and green
systems, · indentifying risk scenarios early and
continuously over the system development processes is
vital. This paper contains various descriptions of risk
from the project (i.e. programmatic) and technical
perspectives, an exploration of the generally accepted
risk management process, and how these relate to
systems development through system goals. The paper
shows the importance of goal and anti-goal analyses in
the early identification of risk scenarios towards the
development of truly sustainable systems. This result is
critical . for engineering managers and systems
engineers who want to make risk management an
integral part of the systems development process.

Exhibit 1. Traceability of goals and sub-systems
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Introduction

The branches connecting the various levels in
Exhibit 1 illustrate how sub-systems (SS's) can be
associated with particular functionalities (F's). The
functionalities, in turn support capabilities (C's) which,
in turn enables the attainment of the goals (G's).

"Regardless of whether it is acknowledged, the process
of system identification followed by risk estimation is
what is truly occurring in risk assessments. "
- (Hatfield and Hipel, 2002, 11).

Risk & Systems Development

In the context of systems development, risk can be

"A system can be broadly defined as an integrated
set of elements that accomplish a defined objective"
(INCOSE, 2004, 10).
Most technical and
organizational systems are created through a process
known as systems development. Systems development
refers to a series of process with the objective of
bringing a system into being. This series of processes
is often associated with the profession of systems
engineering, engineering management, and project
management. In practice of developing a system, there
are several established models to choose from, some of
which are ad-hoc, iterative, prototyping, exploratory,

· described as "a measure of the uncertainty of attaining
a goal, objective, or requirement pertaining to technical
performance, cost, and schedule" (INCOSE, 2004, 63).
Furthermore, the management of these risks, "in the
context of Systems Engineering, is the recognition,
assessment, and control of uncertainties that may result
in schedule delays, cost overruns, performance
problems, adverse environmental impacts, or other
undesired consequences" (INCOSE, 2004, 61). In
essence, the primary objective of managing risks when
developing a system "is to ensure the delivery of a
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system and its associated processes that meet the
customer's need on time and within budget" in a way
that address "uncertainties both in products and
processes, as well as their interrelationships"
(INCOSE, 2004, 61).

transference of risks across systems boundaries
traditionally drawn by convention or convenience, i.e.
projects compared to programs as emphasized by Alali
and Pinto (2009).
Furthermore, it has always been a challenge to
assimilate the temporal domain of risk in the
development of systems. As pointed out by Hofstetter
et al. (2002) and more recently by Haimes (2009),
actions meant to manage risks can create both further
risks as well as synergistic effects in the future similar to a pebble dropped in the pond that creates
ripples. These ripple-effects, especially in the context
of environmental risks have proven to be a challenge
from both the risk management as well as systems
analysis perspective, as discussed by Hatfield and
Hipel (2002).

Scenario Identification
In the realm of risk management (to include risk
assessment, analysis, and mitigation), the default
preliminary step is the identification of risk scenarios.
This step essentially determines what later on will be
the focus of the rest of the risk management processes.
"Risk identification is the process of recognizing
potential risks and their root causes" (INCOSE, 2004,
62) and is essential in setting priorities for more
detailed risk assessment.
Risk scenarios must be expressed in a clear way to
enable analysis and defensible management. Garvey
(2008) suggests the "condition-if-then construct" to
express risk scenarios (p. 33).
In essence, this
construct allows the undesirable consequence be stated
conditioned on a contributing event or root cause. As
an example, consider the undesirable consequence
tunnel is flooded to be symbolized by A, and a known
contributing event water main in the tunnel breaks
symbolized by B. This risk scenario can be expressed
using the condition-if-then construct as:

From a systems analysis perspective, the two
commonly held approaches to risk scenarios
identification are bottom-up and top-down approaches.
Bottom-up approach to risk identification is drawn
from the systems analysis approach of the same name
and relies on knowledge of what are elements of the
systems and how these elements are expected to work
together. This approach is most commonly evident in
reliability analysis and is embodied in tools or
techniques such as FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis), fault trees, and alike. On the other hand,
top-down approach to risk identification is drawn from
the systems analysis approach of the same name and
relies on knowledge of the objectives of the systems.

AIB = tunnel is flooded conditioned on water main in
the tunnel breaks
Risk scenarios expressed in this way facilitates the use
of statistics and probabilities, i.e. estimating P(AIB)
where P can be interpreted as either the chance of
occurrence or degree of belief. Furthermore, this
construct also facilitates the search for other
contributing events or causes, e.g. AIC, AID, etc which
is a significant aspect of the entire risk management
process.

In practice, these two approaches of top-down and
bottom-up applied together create synergy which
provides risk analysts a more efficient identification of
risk scenarios. The bottom-up approach, which relies
heavily on empirical and historical data of previously
known risks, coupled with knowledge of cause-andeffects leads to a detailed set of risks with causes and
effects. These risks are also termed as faults or failures
in reliability analysis. The ·top-down approach, which
relies on what is known or perceived to be objectives
of the systems coupled with a process of logical
elimination or exclusion provides general set of risks.
The focus of this article, anti-goal approach, has
stronger affinity to the top-down approach to risk
identification.

Nonetheless,
identifying
risk
scenarios,
particularly the unknown unknowns is not a trivial
process, as shown by Parsons (2007) particularly for
large and complex systems such as those in NASA's
space exploration. This challenge applies to both
identifying the root undesirable event A as well as the
contributing events B, C, etc. Yet, a complete set of
risk scenarios is an ideal characteristic of an effective
risk management process (Kaplan 1997).

The distinction between these two approaches of
identifying risk scenarios become more apparent in
systems development for several reasons:
The system being developed is not yet
existing, as such, all risk scenarios, are in
essence synthesized and results of informed
conjecture,

Lately, there has been an emphasis on expanding
the traditional realm of risk scenarios to include those
that would usually be seen as remote, unrelated or are
out of system bounds. Primarily, these has been the
result of the ·observable but not-well-understood
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Usability
of bottom-up
approach
to
identifying risk events is limited and is
dependent on the uniqueness of the system
being developed and its comparability to
existing systems
The mapping of systems development process
with systems life cycle results to decision in
the systems development process predicated
to the perceived goals
The large number of possible risk scenarios
coupled with the uncertainty in the potential
consequences makes discerning the more
important risk scenarios more challenging

In identifying system adversaries and their
capabilities that will enable these anti-goals to occur, a
threat graph can be created that will show attack points for the anti goal. A goal is reached when at least
one possible combination of necessary capabilities is
functioning.
It is notable that while a system
proponent supports goals that make the system run, a
system adversary will support anti-goals that make a
system fail.

Extension of anti-goals
As pointed out in the earlier section, there is the more
general challenge of identifying risk scenarios
(including but not limited to security-related risks)
beyond the traditional realms brought about by the
evolution of currently existing systems and systems yet
to be developed. This is further complicated by the
nature of risk scenarios transcending established
systems boundaries and being influenced by nontechnical factors such as culture, policies, and
regulations.

It is evident that risk identification in the context
of systems development is very much related to but not
exactly the same in the traditional sense. The entire
nature of systems development being primarily systemgoal-driven, as shown in Exhibit 1 places more
emphasis on the top-down approach to risk
identification.

Anti-goals
The notion of anti-goal originates from the notion that
security-related goals in systems development require
special analysis to assure reliability and dependability.
Van Lamsweerde et al. (2003) provides an early
discussion of how system goals, models of these goals,
and resulting anti-models and anti-goals may provide a
better way to draw security-related systems
requirements.

Even though the original intent of using anti-goals
is toward more efficient elicitation of security-related
requirements, the underlying concepts may hold great
potential in addressing the difficulties of identifying
risk scenarios in systems development. This article
proposes the extension and modification of some
underlying concepts of anti-goals in order to affect the
following:
- provide a convergence between the practice of risk
scenario identification and goal analysis in systems
development
- facilitate risk scenario identification in systems
development
- develop goal-oriented risk management approach
suitable for goal-oriented systems development
- provide risk manager a mindset to expand the realm
of traditional risk identification process
- provide a venue to integrate non-technical factors in
risk identification, e.g. culture, policies, regulation,
conventions, etc.

The basic steps in identifying anti-goals are
(adapted from Van Lamsweerde et al. 2003, 52-53):
I . Enumerate known goals of system being developed
( e.g. provide secure data exchange)
2. Generate most general or root anti-goals by negation
of known goals (e.g. data exchange is not secure)
3. Refine anti-goals to level of specificity required by
the current system development stage.
4. Identify who and what will enable these anti-goals to
occur (e.g. who will benefit from insecure data
exchange and what they need to do to accomplish this)
5. Refine the details of the anti-goals until these details
can be mapped to the technical requirements of the
system being developed.

Initially, working descriptions of terms are laid
out. These are adaptation of terms presented by Van
Lamsweerde et al. (2003) and supplemented by
concepts from works of Kaplan (1997), Hofstetter et al.
(2002), Garvey (2008), Haimes (2009), and Alali and
Pinto (2009).

The concept of anti-goal was also mentioned by
Barton et al. (2004, p. 10), not from systems
development perspective but from the more general
system-thinking perspective as a way to look "180
degrees around in the opposite direction" of system
goal. Since then, the notion of anti-goal has been
extended to safety-critical systems (e.g. in Hab1i et al.
2007), and has appeared in discussions on human
psychology (e.g. Norling, 2004 and Carver, 2006).

Goal is a hierarchical description of a system's desired
events
Anti-goal is a statement that expresses the logical
negation of a goal
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However, Equation (1) only shows that Cl' or C2'
or ( C 1' and C2' are sufficient causes for G 1', but does
not imply necessity. This means that there are possibly
other potential causes of G 1' not represented by the
collection of events Ca. If all these other unspecified
causes are collectively expressed as Ca', then

The goal is termed to be hierarchical due to the
possibility for any goal to be described is varying
degree of details, specificity, or refinement. This
implies that anti-goals are also hierarchical similar to
goals. Extending and modifying the condition-if-then
construct described earlier such that:
A: goal
A': anti-goal
B: contributing event

(2)

P(Gl 'ICa') = 1

By total probability theorem, Equation (1) and (2) can
be used to express nut just the risk scenarios but also
the unconditional probability of GI not being attained,
i.e. P(Gl ') as shown in Equation (3).

Then, A'IB is a risk scenario relating the anti-goal (or
equivalently, undesirable event) with a contributing
event B. Having anti-goal A' traceable to the goal A
allows the system developer to use the condition-ifthen construct and still have the traceability required in
any systems development endeavor. Looking back at
Exhibit 1 which illustrates the role of capabilities (C's)
in attaining the goals, consider the roles of C 1 and C2
in attaining G 1. This branch of the larger tree is shown
in Exhibit 2.

P(G 1 ') = P(G 1'ICa)P(Ca) + P(G l 'ICa')P(Ca')

What has been shown for the two top-most level in
Exhibit 2 can also be applied to other levels, e.g. Cl
and functions F2 and F2, etc. Exhibit 3 illustrates the
mirror-image that anti-goal analysis may provide for
Exhibit 2.
Exhibit 3. Risk scenario tree produced from anti-goal
analysis

Exhibit 2. Traceability for G 1

''

Exhibit 2 suggests both CI and C2 are needed and are
enough to attain G 1. That is, Cl and C2 will be, by
design, both necessary and sufficient to attain G 1. As a
direct corollary, failure of either Cl or C2 (or both)
will cause G 1 to not be attained. In essence, it can be
deduced that:

'

In essence, Equation (3) expresses the unconditional
probability of G 1 not being attained. This is illustrated
in Exhibit 3 as the mirror image G l '. Goal-oriented
systems development process, such as that illustrated in
Exhibit 2, provides important information for
identifying some risk scenarios, and can be expressed
as conditional probabilities such as in Equation (1 ).
Nonetheless, Equation (2) also highlights that there are
more risk scenarios that may not be readily identifiable.
These two sets of risk scenarios are illustrated in
Exhibit 3 as Ca and Ca'. At the lowest level of the risk
scenario tree are sub-systems which may be logical
suspect to accomplish risk scenarios corresponding to
functionality level.

Gl: goal
G 1 ': anti-goal
C 1 ': compliment of C 1 (i.e. failure to deliver C 1)
C2': compliment ofC2 (i.e. failure to deliver C2)

If events CI' or C2' or (Cl' and C2') are collectively
referred to as Ca, then
P(Gl 'ICI' or C2' or (Cl' and C2')) = 1.
P(Gl 'ICa) = 1

(3)

Conclusion, Analysis and Recommendations
It has been shown that the concept of anti-goal holds
potential beyond its original intent of facilitating
elicitation of security-related requirements is systems
development. Coupled with concepts from the risk

(1)
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management practice, the extension of the concept of
anti-goals presents potential areas for further
investigation, such as:
- Formally defining goals, capabilities and functions
supporting goals - including possible alternative
combinations thereof - to pertain not only to
proponents but also to adversaries may allow use of
game-theories in developing high-assurance systems
- The traceability of the role of sub-systems to failures
in functionalities, capabilities, and anti-goal may
enable threat and vulnerability analysis to be conducted
in parallel to systems development
- The ability to represent risk scenarios as conditional
and unconditional probabilities may be coupled with
evidence-based analysis (e.g. use of Bayesian analysis)
to allow quantitative risk assessment to be performed
concurrent with systems development. Conditionality
can represent both correlations as well as causation
relationships.
- Interdependencies among sub-systems can be
described both in the functionality space as well as in
risk space
- Use of knowledge management to discover both
known and unknown unknowns may lead to more
accurate risk assessment.

References
Alali, Baqer and C. Ariel Pinto "Project, Systems, and
Risk Management Processes & Interaction,"
Proceedings of the PICMET '09 Portland
International
Center for Management of
Engineering and Technology, Portland, Oregon,
USA (August 2-6) 2009.
Barton, John, Merrelyn Emery, Robert Louis Flood,
John W. Selsky, Eric Wolstenholm, "A Maturing
of Systems Thinking: Evidence from Three
Perspectives," Systemic Practice and Action
Research, 17:1 ( 2004) pp. 3-36.
Blanchard, B.S. & Fabrycky, W.J, Systems
Engineering and Analysis, 4th ed., Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. (2006).
Carver, Charles S., "Approach, Avoidance, and the
Self-Regulation of Affect and Action," Motivation
and Emotion, Springer Netherlands, 30:2, June
(2006).
Garvey, Paul R. Analytical Methods for Risk
Management: A Systems Engineering Perspective
CRC Press (2008).
Habli, Ibrahim Weihang Wu, Katrina Attwood, Tim
Kelly, Extending Argumentation to Goal-Oriented
Requirements Engineering (Book Series Lecture
Notes in Computer Science) (2007).
Haimes, Yacov. Y. "On the Complex Definition of
Risk: A Systems-Based Approach." Risk Analysis,
29:12 (2009) pp. 1647-1654.

Hatfield, Adam J. and Keith W. Hipel "Risk and
Systems Theory," Risk Analysis, 22:6 (2002) pp.
1043-1057.
Hofstetter, Patrick, Jane C. Bare, James K. Hammitt,
Patricia A. Murphy, and Glenn E. Rice, 'Tools for
Comparative Analysis of Alternatives: Competing
or Complementary Perspectives?," Risk Analysis,
22:5 (2002) pp. 833-851.
INCOSE, Systems Engineering Handbook, INCOSETP-2003-016-02, Version 2a, 1 June (2004).
Kaplan, Stan "The Words of Risk Analysis," Risk
Analysis, 17:4 (1997) pp. 407-417.
Norling, Emma, "Folk Psychology for Human
Modelling: Extending the BDI Paradigm,"
Proceedings of the International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, voll
(2004) pp. 202 - 209
Parsons, Vickie. S. "Searching for "Unknown
Unknowns" Engineering Management Journal,
19:1 (2007) pp. 43-46.
Van Lamsweerde, Axel, Simon Brohez, Renaud De
Landtsheer, and David Janssens, "From System
Goals to Intruder Anti-Goals: Attack Generation
and Resolution for Security Requirements
Engineering," Proceedings of the 2nd International
Workshop on Requirements Engineering for High
Assurance Systems (2003) pp. 48-56.

Acknowledgement
The authors would like to acknowledge the support of
Old Dominion University (ODU) Office of Research
through its 2010 Multidisciplinary Seed Grant, ODU's
Department of Engineering Management and Systems
Engineering, the National Centers for System of
Systems Engineering, and the Emergent Risk Initiative
at ODU, and ODU's Batten College of Engineering
and Technology through the dean's faculty
development grant.
About the Authors
C. Ariel Pinto is an Associate Professor in the
Department of Engineering Management and Systems
Engineering at Old Dominion University. His research
is in the areas of risk management in engineered
systems, project risk management, risk valuation and
communication, and analysis of extreme-and-rare
events. He received his Ph.D. in Systems Engineering
from the University of Virginia, and Master and
Bachelor degrees in Industrial Engineering from the
University of the Philippines.
Andreas Tolk is Associate Professor for Engineering
Management and Systems Engineering at Old
Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia. He is also a
Senior Research Scientist at the Virginia Modeling

365

Analysis and Simulation Center (VMASC). He holds a
M.S. in Computer Science (1988) and a Ph.D. in
Computer Science and Applied Operations Research
(1995), both from the University of the Federal Armed
Forces of Germany in Munich. He is a member of
ASEM, ACM SIGSIM, SCS, SISO, MORS, and
NDIA.
Rafael Landaeta is Associate Tenured Professor in the
department of Engineering Management and Systems
Engineering. He holds a M.S. in Engineering
Management and a Ph.D. in Industrial Engineering
from the University of Central Florida. He received a
B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from UNITEC,
Venezuela. He has performed applied research for the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Army
Program Executive Office Soldier, The U.S. Army
Core of Engineers, Siemens-Westinghouse Power
Generation,
Walt
Disney
World-Information
Technology, NASA-Kennedy Space Center, The
National Centers for Systems of Systems Engineering,
The Institute of Simulation and Training, and the
Industrialized Housing Partnership of the U.S.
Department of Energy.

366

